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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRITIQUE IN  
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
NICKOLAS J JAMES* 
[For much of its history, Australian legal education has been dominated by doctrinal approaches to 
the teaching of law. Initially, legal education in Australia was little more than the uncritical 
transmission of legal doctrine by legal practitioners. It was not until the post-World War II 
emergence of the professional law teacher in Australia that a more scholarly approach was taken to 
the teaching of law. It took the influence of radicalism, feminism and the Critical Legal Studies 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s for legal critique to be taught in the law school. Resistance to 
trends within legal education perceived by some to be too radical meant that the decision to include 
legal critique in the curriculum was often a controversial one, and that the growth of legal critique 
in Australian legal education was generally slow. In the past decade, critique has flourished in 
Australian legal scholarship, and mainstream legal education scholars have increasingly called for 
a greater emphasis on legal critique in the teaching of law. However, while many law schools have 
adopted teaching policies and programs which appear to encourage legal critique, it is still given a 
relatively low priority, and the present trend appears to be for legal education to become more 
practical rather than more critical. In the year 2000 legal critique remains an underemphasised 
and marginalised approach to the teaching of law in Australia.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
I do not have fond memories of my time as an undergraduate law student. I 
recall many long hours struggling to understand and to commit to memory vast 
quantities of legal doctrine. I might occasionally have smiled slightly at some 
witticism scribbled by another student in the margin of a particularly dull case 
report, but otherwise, my expression for five years was a bored pout. I knew 
people who were excited or passionate about the subject matter of their study, but 
to me, it all seemed so dry, so technical, and so irrelevant.  
It was not until I commenced my postgraduate studies that I discovered an 
approach to law that was of genuine interest to me: critique. Finally, the disci-
pline of law came to life. Critique excited my attitude and invigorated my 
intelligence. It painted a picture of the law not as a body of dead rules, but as a 
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political mechanism, a social phenomenon, an imperfect regime. Critique placed 
the law into a context, and connected the law to a higher reality. Critique dared to 
mock the law’s self-righteousness. 
Why had I remained oblivious to this perspective for so long? Why had I spent 
so many years studying legal doctrine, and so little time engaging in legal 
critique? I had completed the obligatory Jurisprudence course, but at the time it 
had seemed to be nothing more than obscure and irrelevant theorising. It was 
understood amongst my fellow students that it was a subject that was to be 
painfully endured and quickly forgotten. If only legal critique had been revealed 
to me sooner; if only I had been encouraged to take it more seriously, to give it 
the importance that it deserved, an importance that it was so rarely accorded in 
undergraduate programs. 
In this paper I trace the story of legal critique in Australian legal education, and 
assess the status of legal critique today. I conclude that, in the year 2000, while 
many law schools are finally beginning to recognise and accept its importance, 
legal critique remains a marginalised and underemphasised approach to the 
teaching of law.  
The story of legal critique is only one aspect of the ongoing development of 
legal education in Australia, but it is a distinctive and crucial one. Two things 
become apparent upon consideration of legal critique in its historical context. 
The first is that there are as many understandings of the meaning and purpose of 
legal critique as there are participants in the story. The second is that opinions 
vary markedly: some teachers would like to see legal critique become an im-
portant component of legal education, while others would like to see it dominate, 
or even disrupt; others still would prefer that it not be present at all. 
I I   COLONIAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Until the latter half of the 19th century aspiring lawyers in Australia were 
trained by more experienced practitioners in accordance with the apprenticeship 
model imported from England. Colonial legal education was limited to on-the-job 
training, with the consequence that legal knowledge was relatively narrow, and 
primarily practical; theoretical development of the discipline was minimal. 
Eventually, concern within the community about the ability, competence and 
respectability of the colonial lawyers (some of whom were former convicts) led 
to a recognition of the need to improve the image of the profession, and steps 
were taken to shift responsibility for professional legal education from the 
profession itself to the universities.1 
The first law school in Australia was established at the University of Sydney in 
1855.2 The decision to install professional legal education as a discipline within 
 
 1 See, eg, Linda Martin, ‘From Apprenticeship to Law School: A Social History of Legal 
Education in Nineteenth Century New South Wales’ (1986) 9 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 111. 
 2 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline 
Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (1987) vol 1, 1. 
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the academy was a controversial one.3 Many scholars viewed law as a practical 
vocation rather than as an academic discipline. Nevertheless, the political power 
of the profession was sufficient to overcome any resistance, and ensured that its 
desire to see law taught in Australian universities was implemented. 4  Law 
schools were subsequently established at the University of Melbourne in 1857,5 
the University of Adelaide in 1883,6 the University of Tasmania in 1893,7 the 
University of Western Australia in 1927,8 and the University of Queensland in 
1935.9 
The approach of the first Australian law schools to teaching law was strictly 
formalist and doctrinal. Legal education was little more than ‘the imparting of 
information in the form of legal principles, rules and propositions … to be 
committed to memory for examination purposes’. 10  The legal profession 
controlled both the content of the curriculum and its teaching. Further, law 
teachers were usually practitioners appointed to the university on a part-time 
basis, and lectures were generally given in the evenings to students who were 
studying part-time whilst completing articles.11 
The existence of the law school within the academy was grudgingly accepted 
as a reality by other scholars, but the discipline was accorded a relatively low 
status, and the law schools were perceived as mere ‘adjuncts to the profession 
rather than truly academic institutions’.12 
I I I   POST-WORLD WAR II :  THE PROFESSIONAL LAW TEACHER AND 
THE SCIENCE OF LAW 
After World War II the academic status of Australian legal education began to 
improve. The approaches and practices of the profession at that time were 
perceived by the Australian government as lagging behind those in directly 
comparable countries, and changes to university legal education were made as a 
means of ‘modernising’ the legal profession.13 Part-time teaching by practition-
ers in law schools was discouraged, and the number of full-time legal academics 
 
 3 See Martin, above n 1, 127–8. 
 4 The discipline of law has actually been a part of the university for as long as there have been 
universities: it is one of the founding disciplines. It was first taught at the University of Bologna 
in Italy in the 12th century, and was later taught in England at the Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge. The first law schools, however, taught law as a liberal art; legal education within the 
university had nothing to do with training for legal practice. Rather, the focus was on Roman 
law, canon law and jurisprudence. See, eg, Helene Wieruszowski, The Medieval University: 
Masters, Students, Learning (1966) 62–73. 
 5 Council of Australian Law Deans, Studying Law in Australia 2001 (2000) 4. 
 6 Ibid 80. 
 7 Ibid 83. 
 8 Ibid 90. 
 9 Ibid 103. 
 10 Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, Report on the Future of Tertiary 
Education in Australia to the Australian Universities Commission (1964) [11.27], [11.38]. 
 11 Pearce, Campbell and Harding, above n 2, vol 1, 3. 
 12 Michael Chesterman and David Weisbrot, ‘Legal Scholarship in Australia’ (1987) 50 Modern 
Law Review 709, 711. 
 13 See, eg, Judith Lancaster, The Modernisation of Legal Education (1993) 2. 
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was increased significantly. This led to the emergence of the ‘professional law 
teacher’, and to a concerted endeavour to adopt a more scholarly approach to the 
teaching of law. 14  With the existence of larger numbers of full-time legal 
academics, other scholars began to accord the discipline a greater level of 
academic credibility.15 
The new full-time law teachers in Australia marginalised, and eventually ex-
cluded, the contributions of legal practitioners. Professional law teachers created 
their own uniqueness and justified their own existence by emphasising their 
distinctive ways of thinking about and teaching law as a scientific and rigorous 
academic discipline.16 Australian law schools embraced legal scientism or the 
‘law as science’ approach that had been developed in the United States nearly 
three quarters of a century earlier. This new approach to teaching law 
de-emphasised the connections with legal practice and, at the same, time main-
tained the separation of law from other disciplines in the university. The taking of 
a scientific approach to teaching law involved dividing the law into discrete 
conceptual fields, each with its own set of principles, while excluding questions 
of social policy, politics and the use of non-legal data. Law was taught as ‘a 
system of rules … ordered logically within an internally consistent, hermetically 
sealed legal universe’.17 There was no need to look beyond the confines of legal 
doctrine to understand law and its operation. Legal scientism thus served to 
enhance and protect the discipline’s new found academic credibility. 
In the United States legal scientism had been criticised, and significantly modi-
fied, by the Legal Realist movement. The Legal Realists were a disparate group 
of teachers and scholars of the 1920s and 1930s who espoused a critical and 
relativistic approach to the study and teaching of law. 18  Their tenets were 
threefold. They argued first that law was not a science, and that legal rules were 
not objective and value free. Second, they demonstrated the ways in which law 
and legal knowledge were politically constructed. Finally, they pointed to the 
malleability of the language of law and the circularity of traditional legal reason-
ing, and emphasised the role of policy choices rather than rules in judicial 
 
 14 Margaret Thornton, ‘Portia Lost in the Groves of Academe Wondering What to Do about Legal 
Education’ (1991) 9(2) Law in Context 9, 10. 
 15 According to Schlegel, the acceptance of many modern disciplines into universities has followed 
a similar pattern:  
 Each group began by staking out part of the intellectual world as its ‘turf’, adopting a partic-
ular way of looking at that turf, a method as it were, and moving to cut out the ‘amateurs’ who 
formerly had a claim to that turf. Finally they justified those activities by pointing to the ‘mis-
sion’ of the discipline. Such is the process of academic professionalization … 
  John Schlegel, ‘Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Profes-
sionalization of the American Law Professor’ (1985) 35 Journal of Legal Education 311, 314. 
 16 See Marlene Le Brun and Richard Johnstone, The Quiet (R)Evolution: Improving Student 
Learning in Law (1994) 29. See Schlegel, ‘Between the Harvard Founders and the American 
Legal Realists’, above n 15, 311. 
 17 Le Brun and Johnstone, above n 16, 8. 
 18 See, eg, Felix Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 
Columbia Law Review 809; Karl Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism — Responding to 
Dean Pound’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1222. 
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decisions. 19 However, no comparable movement occurred in Australia, either 
contemporaneously or subsequently.20 At the time, unlike their counterparts in 
the United States, Australian law schools did not have full-time complements of 
staff, and were still closely controlled by the profession. Consequently, students 
were still being taught legal doctrine and little else. Even with the new generation 
of professional law teachers, legal critique remained relatively rare; indeed, any 
suggestion that the scientific approach might be deficient was regarded as ‘deeply 
subversive’.21 
It was not until the influence of radicalism, feminism and the Critical Legal 
Studies (‘CLS’) movement in the 1960s and 1970s that the dominance of legal 
doctrinalism and scientism in Australian legal education began to be subverted. 
IV  THE 1970S AND 1980S:  RADICALISM,  FEM INISM  AND 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
The political conservatism within most Australian law schools in the first half 
of the 20th century certainly did not reflect the wider political landscape. There 
had been a tradition of criticism of orthodoxy and subversion of dominance 
within Australian politics for some time. Trade unions had been a force calling 
for changes to the workplace since the 1880s; labour parties were established in 
the various States during the 1890s to provide a political voice for the workers; 
and the Communist Party of Australia was established in the 1920s. 
During the 1970s this critical tradition began to influence the teaching of law 
within Australian law schools. Many teachers began to explore alternative 
politics, and to question orthodox approaches to teaching. Some publicly 
associated themselves with politically radical causes, including left-wing political 
parties, prisoners’ rights movements and community-based legal centres. Within 
the newer law schools in particular,22 the traditional approaches to legal educa-
tion were openly criticised by Marxists and other political radicals.23 
The feminist movement also began to influence some Australian law schools in 
the setting of their curriculum. Elective subjects such as ‘Women and the Law’ 
and ‘Sex Discrimination’ were offered; both sought to teach women’s perspec-
tives on the law.24 While acknowledged as a step in the right direction, these 
 
 19 Robert Stevens, ‘Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School’ in Donald Fleming and 
Bernard Bailyn (eds), Law in American History (1971) 403, 480–1; Thornton, above n 14, 15. 
 20 Thornton, above n 14, 16. 
 21 Rob McQueen, ‘Is There a Critical Legal Studies Movement in Australia? Innovation in 
Australian Legal Education after the Pearce Report’ (1990) 2 Culture and Policy 3, 5. 
 22 Law schools were established at the University of New South Wales in 1971; at Macquarie 
University (New South Wales) in 1974; at the Queensland University of Technology (then the 
Queensland Institute of Technology) in 1976; and at the University of Technology, Sydney (then 
the New South Wales Institute of Technology) in 1977. A ‘Department of Legal Studies’ was 
established at La Trobe University (Victoria) in 1972 within the Faculty of Social Sciences, but 
it was not a ‘law school’ and did not seek to satisfy the educational prerequisites for admission 
to the practice of law. (The School of Law and Legal Studies at La Trobe has offered a law 
degree leading to admission since 1992.) See Council of Australian Law Deans, above n 5. 
 23 Chesterman and Weisbrot, above n 12, 715. 
 24 Clare Dalton, ‘Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought’ 
(1987–88) 3 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 1, 3. 
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subjects were subsequently criticised by feminist scholars because they rein-
forced the perception that ‘women’s issues’ were appropriately taught in special-
ist elective subjects, and ignored the consequences of those issues for the 
mainstream legal curriculum.25 By the late 1970s, however, a uniquely feminist 
legal scholarship had begun to develop. This scholarship was described as being 
derived from female experience and as presenting a point of view contrary to the 
dominant male perception.26 Feminist legal scholars claimed that masculine legal 
scholarship failed to acknowledge or respond to the values, fears and harms 
experienced by women. 27 They analysed a wide range of issues — including 
‘black letter doctrines’ — from feminist viewpoints. 28  Feminist law teachers 
began to exert pressure on law schools to introduce feminist perspectives into the 
compulsory core of the curriculum. However, the disproportionately low number 
of female law teachers and the inherently conservative nature of the discipline 
meant that this project initially met with little success. 
Other radicals in Australian law schools openly declared support for the CLS 
movement. The CLS movement originated in the United States in the late 
1970s.29 At the time, an extremely diluted form of Legal Realism dominated 
American legal education. CLS scholars rediscovered the more controversial and 
critical insights of the Legal Realists, and built on them.30 They accepted the 
insight of the Legal Realists that legal decisions were a matter of choice rather 
than the inevitable conclusions of abstract rules. Nonetheless, they rejected the 
Realists’ belief in the possibility of a legal science founded in the analysis of 
‘policy’, and instead argued that law and legal systems could never be ‘objective’ 
or ‘scientific’. They argued that law was a constructed system of beliefs and 
meanings — in the same way that politics and religion are — that operates to 
make inequalities of wealth and privilege appear natural.31 
In Australia in 1978 the Critique of Law Editorial Collective published a book 
entitled Critique of Law,32 one of the principal themes of which was the explora-
 
 25 Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (1990) 8; see also Regina 
Graycar, ‘ “To Transform the Normative Tradition of Law …” A Comment on the Feminist 
Project in the Law School’ (1986) 58 Australian Quarterly 366; Jenny Morgan, ‘Feminist The-
ory as Legal Theory’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 743. 
 26 See, eg, Gary Minda, ‘The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s’ (1989) 50 Ohio State Law 
Journal 599, 622–32; Ann Scales, ‘Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1981) 56 Indiana Law 
Review 375. 
 27 Gary Minda, ‘Jurisprudence at Century’s End’ (1993) 43 Journal of Legal Education 44. 
 28 Graycar and Morgan, above n 25, 9. 
 29 It was formally launched at the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, in 1977. See, eg, Hilary Charlesworth, ‘New Directions in Legal Theory: Critical Legal 
Studies’ (1989) 63 Law Institute Journal 248, 248; John Schlegel, ‘Notes toward an Intimate, 
Opinionated and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies’ (1984) 36 
Stanford Law Review 391, 396. 
 30 Robert Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Studies as a Teaching Method, against the Background of the 
Intellectual Politics of Modern Legal Education in the United States’ (1989) 1(1) Legal Educa-
tion Review 59, 75. 
 31 Charlesworth, ‘New Directions in Legal Theory’, above n 29, 248. According to Charlesworth, 
the CLS movement in fact embraced a range of sometimes contradictory concerns and theories 
and did not offer a single, homogeneous philosophy of law: at 249. 
 32 Critique of Law Editorial Collective (ed), Critique of Law: A Marxist Analysis (1978). 
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tion of alternatives to the orthodox approach to teaching law in Australia.33 The 
Macquarie Law School and the Department of Legal Studies at La Trobe 
University developed non-orthodox programs of legal education.34 Some of the 
more progressive teachers in other law schools called for the insights of the CLS 
movement to be incorporated into the law curriculum. 
Political theorists and sociologists within universities had been critiquing the 
law for decades, but the question of whether or not it was appropriate for law 
teachers to criticise legal rules and institutions was a novel one in Australia. 
Some endorsed this new role. According to Gordon Samuels, a New South Wales 
Supreme Court judge and university chancellor: 
[A]cademics … have increasingly assumed the character of social conscience to 
the profession and the judiciary. It is a role for which they are well cast, since 
they are neither influenced by professional self-interest nor trammelled by pro-
fessional responsibility. Academics are no more immune than others from 
eventual intellectual sclerosis; but their work keeps them aware of the wider 
ranging currents of legal thought and experiment, and they are constantly ex-
posed to the irreverent reactions of students first encountering the more opaque 
areas of the law. So their contribution ought to be a generally critical one.35 
Others less supportive of this new critical movement argued that: 
In the whole of Australia … there are only one or two academic teachers of any 
real value in real property, in contracts or in torts; yet there are about seventeen 
law schools. … There are, to be sure, multitudes of academic homunculi who 
scribble and prattle relentlessly about such non-subjects as criminology, bail, 
poverty, consumerism, computers and racism. These may be dismissed from 
calculation: they possess neither practical skills nor legal learning. They are 
failed sociologists.36 
The CLS movement also had opponents in the United States. In the controver-
sial 1984 article, ‘Of Law and the River’, Paul Carrington, the Dean of Duke 
University Law School, argued that the radical questioning of the legal order by 
the CLS movement and its loss of romantic innocence and faith in the idea of law 
and its institutions meant that its proponents had ‘an ethical duty to depart the 
Law School’.37 Carrington even suggested that the cynicism of CLS could result 
in students learning the ‘the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation’.38 
 
 33 McQueen, above n 21, 3–4. 
 34 Ibid 4. 
 35 Justice Gordon Samuels, ‘Control of Admission to Practice — Its Effect on Legal Education’ in 
Rosemary Balmford (ed), Legal Education in Australia (1976) vol 1, 681. 
 36 Rod Meagher, ‘The Scope and Limitations of Legal Practice Courses: Should They Replace 
Articles and Pupilage? [H]ow Can You Learn Practice in Theory?’ in Papers of the 7th Com-
monwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 18–23 September 1983 (1983) 173, 175. 
 37 Paul Carrington, ‘Of Law and the River’ (1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 222, 227. 
 38 Ibid. There were other criticisms of CLS, both from outside and from within the movement 
itself. Some critics assumed that the movement was just a Marxist analysis of law by another 
name; others described it as obscure or ‘trivially provocative’, or dismissed it as unrealistic, 
idealistic and impractical. See, eg, Charlesworth, ‘New Directions in Legal Theory’, above n 29, 
249; and especially Alan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan, ‘Law, Politics, and the Critical 
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law 
Review 199, 238; Donald Brosnan, ‘Serious but Not Critical’ (1986) 60 Southern California 
Law Review 262; Lawrence Solum, ‘On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma’ 
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In Australia the reaction to radical movements such as CLS seems to have been 
even more passionate. According to one of the radicals from the University of 
New South Wales Law School, 
[w]hat we in fact got was abuse. We were accused of putting an end to the Law 
School, of working against the students, of destroying the degree, subjected to 
personal abuse, and a scare campaign was concentrated on the students to con-
vince them that their degrees and careers were on the verge of extinction.39 
An article in the Australian Financial Review in 1989 argued that supporters of 
CLS should not be allowed to teach in law schools, because ‘it is their avowed 
intention not to teach law in a way that will be useful to practitioners in the actual 
legal system’; that CLS ‘represents the loony Left of the legal profession’; and 
that its advocates ‘have many of the features of a fundamentalist sect, being 
intolerant of democracy and willing to employ intimidation and misrepresenta-
tion.’40 In the same newspaper the Shadow Minister for Education, Julian Beale, 
referred to the proponents of CLS as ‘a bunch of Leninist fanatics’.41 
In an article published in the Law Society of New South Wales Journal, Andrew 
Lang, a former academic, asked whether students who were taught in a particular 
school staffed by CLS proponents would be employable.42 His answer was a 
conditional ‘no’, because of ‘an abandonment of the balance in the quality and 
interests of the teaching staff, in favour of the theoretical (including sociological), 
at the expense of professionally-oriented courses and adequate coverage of 
substantive law.’43 
A widespread critical legal education movement failed to take hold in Austral-
ia. According to Rob McQueen, this was because ‘[t]he lack of any broader 
purpose, even in the form of a loose national body, exposed many of the initia-
tives of the late 1970s to various processes of attack and/or decay.’44 Many of 
the more progressive academics were ‘weeded out, discriminated against, or 
alternatively pressured to water down unconventional aspects of their courses.’45 
The Pearce Report criticised radical law teachers for what it considered were 
‘unacceptable attitudes to the “legal system” and the requirements of professional 
training.’46 
 
(1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 462. Carrington’s comments provoked a spirited 
response from CLS proponents. See, eg, Peter Martin, ‘“Of Law and the River” and of Nihilism 
and Academic Freedom’ (1985) 35 Journal of Legal Education 1. 
 39 Brian Kelsey, ‘What’s Wrong with the Law School?’ in Critique of Law Editorial Collective (ed), 
Critique of Law: A Marxist Analysis (1978) 124, 125. 
 40 P P McGuiness, ‘Legal Creation Science’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 1 February 
1989, 63, 63–4. 
 41 Julian Beale, Letter to the Editor, Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 2 February 1989, 15. 
 42 Andrew Lang, ‘Will Macquarie Law Graduates Remain Employable?’ [1989] (May) Law 
Society of New South Wales Journal 41. 
 43 Ibid 47. 
 44 McQueen, above n 21, 4. 
 45 Ibid. 
 46 Ibid 4–5. 
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A  The Pearce Report 
The publication of the Pearce Report47 was one of the events most influential 
on the form and direction of Australian legal education at the end of the 20th 
century. The Report was commissioned in 1985 and submitted in 1987. 48 It 
identified a number of problems with Australian legal education, including 
inertia, 49  cause for concern about the commitment to teaching, 50  student 
dissatisfaction with the intellectual calibre,51 a dreary program52 and conflicts 
and divisions.53 It went on to make a series of suggestions about reforming legal 
education in Australia. In relation to the role of critique in legal education, the 
Report noted the following: 
[U]niversities are concerned to evaluate social institutions. They have an im-
portant role as the critic and the conscience of society. They are allowed a wide 
freedom or autonomy to protect that. A university law school is concerned to 
evaluate and criticise the law, legal institutions and legal processes and to ask 
of them ‘what are you good for’ and to assess whether they should be changed. 
In educating law students, accordingly, it is desirable to cultivate a student’s in-
tellect in a spirit of free enquiry and to encourage independent thought and en-
quiry about the law.54 
A university is not just concerned to impart knowledge to students. It is con-
cerned with educating them to develop their intellectual skills of reasoning, in-
dependent thought, enquiry, criticism and evaluation, written and oral commu-
nication, and independent research so that they can realise their human intel-
lectual potential, contribute to society and adapt to change.55 
[A] good undergraduate course should provide an ‘intellectual base for life long 
critical reflectiveness about legal institutions, the profession and one’s own 
work, in the actual and changing conditions of social life and legal practice’ … 
[L]aw courses should expose students to an understanding of the processes and 
functions in society of law and legal institutions, to the variety of modes of so-
cial control, to the moral and political outlooks embedded in law and concep-
tions of professional roles, to questions of justice, to the relevance of social, 
political and moral theories and forces to law, legal institutions and their 
change and development, and to the information and understanding to be drawn 
 
 47 Pearce, Campbell and Harding, above n 2. 
 48 The Report covered a wide range of legal education issues, including an assessment of the 
quality and economic efficiency of each institution providing legal education; the suitability and 
feasibility of the aims of each institution; the nature and quality of undergraduate and postgrad-
uate courses; the standards of teaching and research; staff contributions to law reform, the work 
of government, the profession, and the community’s welfare; the effectiveness of resource utili-
sation and the extent of unnecessary duplication; current deficiencies; the community require-
ment for graduates; and the selection and admission processes: Judith Lancaster, The Moderni-
sation of Legal Education: A Critique of the Martin, Bowen and Pearce Reports (1993) 51. 
 49 The University of Sydney: Pearce, Campbell and Harding, above n 2, vol 1, 40. 
 50 The University of Melbourne: ibid vol 1, 216–17. 
 51 The University of Adelaide: ibid vol 1, 209. 
 52 The University of Western Australia: ibid vol 1, 229. 
 53 Macquarie University: ibid vol 3, 945. 
 54 Ibid vol 1, 21 (citation omitted). 
 55 Ibid vol 1, 22. 
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from the social sciences and social science research for the purpose of evaluat-
ing law.56 
The first of the suggestions made in the Report about reforming legal education 
in Australia was ‘that all law schools examine the adequacy of their attention to 
theoretical and critical perspectives, including the study of law in operation and 
the study of the relations between law and other social forces.’57 
The Report thus seemed to be strongly in favour of the inclusion of critique of 
law within legal education. However, despite these recommendations, the Pearce 
Report also indicated that ‘radical’ movements such as CLS were beyond the 
bounds of appropriate theoretical and critical inquiry in law schools: 
The CLS movement is intimately tied to criticism of American liberalism and 
its influence on Australian law schools has not as yet been marked. That 
Movement and some of the other radical movements currently finding expres-
sion are different from earlier ‘schools’ or trends of thought critical of the law 
and legal institutions in that they appear to attack law schools very fundamen-
tally. They oppose strongly efforts to educate students for careers requiring full 
legal qualifications. While dissent, controversy and critical thought in a univer-
sity or democracy are to be expected and protected there is some concern about 
some of the effects on the functioning of law schools. Observations confirm the 
relevance of that to the Australian context.58 
The Pearce Report particularly criticised the teaching of law in the Macquarie 
University Law School, and recommended that the School be either phased out or 
radically restructured. This recommendation was linked to the identification of 
some of the school’s staff with the CLS movement.59 
The Report’s allegations regarding CLS were subsequently refuted by support-
ers of the movement. In an article encouraging the adoption of some of the 
insights of the CLS movement into Australian legal education, Hilary Charles-
worth wrote: 
The charge that the aims of the CLS movement are fundamentally at odds with 
the education of students for careers requiring full legal qualifications is based 
on a misunderstanding of the Critical project. The CLS movement challenges 
traditional forms of legal education, but it does not question the importance of 
legal education in training legal practitioners. Indeed, the asserted incompati-
bility of the CLS movement and legal education can only be sustained if the 
proper role of legal education is seen as simply the transmission and absorption 
of packages of rules.60 
McQueen responded to the Report in a similar fashion: 
This analysis contained in the Pearce Report of the Macquarie situation in par-
ticular, and the ‘critical legal studies’ movement more generally, seems unfor-
tunately to confuse an attack on certain aspects of current law teaching with an 
 
 56 Ibid vol 1, 105 (citation omitted). 
 57 Ibid vol 1, 59. 
 58 Ibid vol 1, 49. 
 59 Ibid vol 3, 947; see also Charlesworth, ‘New Directions in Legal Theory’, above n 29, 248. 
 60 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Critical Legal Education’ (1988–89) 5 Australian Journal of Law and 
Society 27, 34. 
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attack on ‘Law Schools’ per se. An argument for the severing of the existing 
ties between the profession and the legal academies does not necessarily have 
as its corollary an end to all professional training. … 
The project of many so-called ‘CLS’ adherents might amount to little more than 
having legal ‘scholarship’ accorded its due weighting in the legal curricula. 
This is hardly subversive of legal education per se, and could indeed be seen as 
adding a vital component to University studies in law.61 
The fate of Macquarie University Law School was ultimately decided by the 
report of the committee established by the University itself to review the Law 
School.62 In the lead up to that report the ‘traditionalist majority’ within the Law 
School had criticised those of their colleagues who belonged to 
the narrow American based movement which has abrogated to itself the title 
‘critical legal studies’. This is simply a minority movement of academics who 
are attempting to destabilize and politicize the legal structure and the basics of 
legal scholarship in accordance with Marxist or neo-Marxist doctrine.63 
The response of the ‘progressives’ to this allegation, and to the claim that the 
‘professional’ function of legal education should take priority over the ‘academic’ 
function, included the following: 
[T]here is a need, unfulfilled by traditional/professional approaches to legal 
education, to develop in students proper intellectual skills and habits — essen-
tially the capacity to analyse and reflect systematically upon problems, drawing 
on a store of knowledge and experience of their own — and others’ — culture; 
they also need to develop a critical mind, one which requires authority to justify 
itself, one which looks beyond the obvious and taken-for-granted world of 
‘common sense’ or legal doctrine and precedent. It is a mind which is open in-
tellectually, flexible and innovative. A ‘professional’ approach to legal educa-
tion cannot aspire to those goals.64 
The Review Committee essentially endorsed this progressive approach, and 
recommended that ‘[t]he School should continue to direct its efforts towards a 
coherent, broad-based and interdisciplinary legal education’ and that in pressing 
forward with this aim, ‘the School should endeavour to infuse relevant back-
ground material (historical, sociological, etc) and critical analysis into the 
so-called professional subjects’.65 
The majority of Australian law schools were left to wrestle with the dilemma 
created by the Pearce Report: how to include critical perspectives in the curricu-
lum without being too critical of legal institutions and the law school. 
 
 61 McQueen, above n 21, 9. 
 62 See Gill Boehringer, ‘Resisting Pearce: The Significance of the Review of Macquarie Law 
School — The Role of Macquarie’s Progressives’ (1988–89) 5 Australian Journal of Law and 
Society 93, 93. 
 63 Ibid 95–6, citing Peden et al, ‘Submission to Macquarie University Council: The Third Chair of 
Law’ (1985). 
 64 Boehringer, above n 62, 97, citing Boehringer et al, ‘Submission to the Committee to Review 
the School of Law: The Way Forward’ (1985). 
 65 Boehringer, above n 62, 99, citing Macquarie University, Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Review the School of Law (1987). 
   
M.U.L.R. — James — printed 13/12/2016 at 3:53 PM — page 976 of 17
  
976 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 24 
     
V  T HE 1990S:  A MORE CRITICAL DIRECTION 
During the 1990s Australian legal education scholarship generally shifted 
towards emphasising clinical or skills-based legal education. 66  On the other 
hand, ‘mainstream’ legal education scholars increasingly included references to 
the importance of critique in their writing, and many law schools began to 
include references to legal critique in their teaching policies and course descrip-
tions. 
Feminist legal scholarship and literature about feminist approaches to teaching 
increased, but very little was written, either in Australia or the United States, 
about the contribution of CLS to the teaching of law. While CLS still existed as a 
trend within, or as a category of, United States literature on legal theory, it no 
longer seemed to be as controversial or as prominent a ‘movement’ as it was in 
the 1980s, particularly in Australia. There are a number of reasons for the 
‘failure’ of the CLS movement in Australia. First, the links between CLS and 
Marxism provoked a stronger conservative reaction in Australia because of the 
activist nature of Australian Marxism.67 This political backlash led to a reluc-
tance on the part of many teachers and scholars to identify themselves as CLS 
adherents. Second, conflict within the movement itself about the meaning and 
direction of critique resulted in a failure to present a united front against more 
conservative trends. The final reason is that the linguistic/postmodern ‘turn’ of 
CLS scholarship alienated many adherents, and excluded potentially interested 
outsiders. 68 Nevertheless, CLS did not vanish completely, and it continued to 
influence the teaching of law in Australia. Some law teachers incorporated the 
insights of the CLS movement into their teaching, and a small number of law 
schools adopted the teaching of CLS perspectives into subjects in the undergrad-
uate and postgraduate curriculum.69 
Many radical law teachers resisted the pressure to make their courses and 
scholarship more ‘practical’ and, although refusing to identify themselves as 
 
 66 More recently, this has extended to the teaching of legal professional ethics. There is also an 
increased emphasis on the meaning and process of ‘learning’: Le Brun and Johnstone, above 
n 16, 54–88. 
 67 This may be contrasted with the more theoretical (ie, Frankfurt School) Marxism in the law 
schools of the United States. 
 68 It seems that any movement solely concerned with critique inevitably self-destructs: a critical 
movement that does not critique itself is merely hypocritical, but a critical movement that does 
critique itself delegitimises itself, or at least appears to do so, and thereafter ceases to be taken 
seriously by outsiders. 
 69 Current Australian examples include the following: Australian National University, ‘LAWS2218: 
Feminist and Critical Legal Theory’ in Undergraduate Handbook 2001 (2000) 506; Flinders 
University of South Australia, ‘LLAW 2105: History and Philosophy of Law’ and 
‘LLAW Modern Legal Theory’ in Calendar 2000 — Volume 2: Course Information (1999) 203, 
210; Monash University, ‘LAW4130: Law and Social Theory’ and ‘LAW4137: Legal Philoso-
phy’ in Undergraduate Courses and Subjects 2000 (1999) 443, 444; the University of Mel-
bourne, ‘730-115: History and Philosophy of Law II’ in 2001 Undergraduate Handbook (2000) 
695; the University of New England, ‘LS 355: Jurisprudence’ in 2001 Handbook (2000) 639; 
the University of Newcastle, ‘LLB624: Theories and Law’ in 2001 Undergraduate Handbook 
(2000) 519; the University of Sydney, ‘LAWS 3021: Critical Legal Studies’ in Faculty of Law 
Handbook 2000 (1999) 13; the University of Tasmania, ‘BLA613: Jurisprudence 3’ in Course 
and Unit Handbook 2001 (2000) C-301; the University of Western Australia, ‘200.311: Critical 
Legal Theory’ in Handbook 2001: Faculty of Law (2000) 45. 
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critical scholars (for many, the terms ‘critical’ and ‘CLS’ are now inextricably 
entwined), they continued to critique the law. They continued to raise questions 
about the nature and legitimacy of legal knowledge as described in the traditional 
approaches to legal education and scholarship. They still sought to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the conceptualisation of law as objective, neutral, 
non-gendered, value-free and voiceless; to question the claim that law is an 
autonomous area of inquiry that can be studied independently of political, 
economic, social and historical circumstance; and to argue that the status quo is 
not inevitable, but is shaped by the values and political forces of society. They 
often applied postmodern techniques of ‘deconstruction’ to legal doctrines and 
cases, in order to demonstrate how interpretations of legal texts privileged one 
meaning over other possible meanings. Some of these law teachers identified 
themselves through specific titles such as ‘critical race scholar’ or ‘feminist legal 
scholar’, or identified their scholarship as socio-legal, cultural-legal, feminist, 
indigenous, postmodern or ‘law and literature’. Many, though, did not label 
themselves at all.70 
‘Mainstream’ Australian legal scholars increasingly emphasised the importance 
of incorporating some form of legal critique into the teaching of law. For 
example, Marlene Le Brun and Richard Johnstone stated in their influential 1994 
text, The Quiet (R)Evolution: Improving Student Learning in Law: 
Since we know that no one has a ‘purchase’ on reality — that our world is 
made up of a cacophony of voices — we believe that we as law teachers must 
ensure that our students understand that the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and 
beliefs that are transmitted in law schools are only perspectives on social life 
and law. As a result, in our opinion, our job as teachers of law is to expose our 
students to various theories so that they are better placed to select and adapt 
what they learn to construct their own legal world view. Teaching law in a crit-
ical way facilitates this objective.71 
According to John Goldring, writing in 1998 about contemporary Australian 
legal scholarship: 
Among legal academics there is a growing belief that whatever the aims of le-
gal education and legal scholarship may be, they must include the development 
 
 70 Examples of contemporary critical legal scholars and scholarship within Australia include: Ian 
Duncanson at La Trobe University (see, eg, Ian Duncanson, ‘Legal Education and the Possibility 
of Critique: An Australian Perspective’ (1993) 8(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 59; 
Ian Duncanson, ‘Broadening the Discipline of Law’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Re-
view 1075; Ian Duncanson, ‘Interdisciplinarity in the Law Discipline’ (1996) 5 Griffith Law 
Review 77); Alison Young at the University of Melbourne (see, eg, Alison Young, Femininity in 
Dissent (1990); Alison Young, ‘The Aesthetics of Vertigo and the Jurisprudence of Disgust’ 
(2000) 11 Law and Critique); Judith Grbich at La Trobe University (see, eg, Judith Grbich, ‘The 
Form of the Tax Reform Story: Marshall, Ordinary Meanings and the City Men’ (1996) 5 Grif-
fith Law Review 40; Judith Grbich, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence as Women’s Studies in Law: Aus-
tralian Dialogues’ in Andre-Jean Arnaud and Elizabeth Kingdom (eds), Women’s Rights and the 
Rights of Man (1990) 75); Peter Rush at the University of Melbourne (see, eg, Peter Rush, ‘An 
Altered Jurisdiction: Corporeal Traces of Law’ (1997) 6 Griffith Law Review 144). Examples of 
Australian law journals concerned with legal critique are Law and Critique; Australian Feminist 
Law Journal; Law, Text, Culture; Law in Context; and the Melbourne University Law Review’s 
Critique and Comment section. 
 71 Le Brun and Johnstone, above n 16, 394. 
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of critical techniques and attitudes. These objectives should be as important 
within legal education as they are in other areas of scholarship and higher edu-
cation.72 
Charles Sampford and David Wood echo this in their 1998 revision of an 
earlier article, arguing that 
it is clear that a large proportion of the profession freely acknowledges that not 
only is a university-style education at the core of a good legal education, the 
traditional conception of a profession as involving a body of knowledge and 
skills is no longer adequate in the 20th (and soon 21st) century. What is needed 
is a critical questioning and reflexive awareness of that knowledge and skills; 
these qualities are the hallmark of a good university education.73 
Andrew Stewart also concurred in his 1999 article, ‘Educating Australian 
Lawyers’: 
A critical understanding of how the legal system actually works is arguably es-
sential to being a good lawyer. … So whether or not law schools should con-
tinue to see their main role as preparing lawyers for practice … there is every 
reason to aim for a curriculum which equips graduates with the foundational 
knowledge and skills needed to go onto a legal career, including the capacity to 
reflect critically on the nature and practical operation of legal systems.74 
The call for law teaching in Australia to be more critical no longer emanated 
solely from the radical fringe element of the law school, but was being voiced by 
some of the country’s most respected commentators on legal education. 
VI  TODAY:  CRITICAL OR CLINICAL?  
How have Australia’s law schools responded to this cry for a greater emphasis 
upon legal critique? More law schools appear to be willing to promote them-
selves openly as including legal critique in their curriculum. Griffith University 
Law School, for example, promotes itself as offering a law degree which ‘bal-
ances and integrates the satisfaction of admission requirements with emphasis 
upon the critical and theoretical aspects of legal education’.75 The homepage of 
Southern Cross University’s School of Law and Justice sets out five key aims of 
the law school, the first two of which are directly relevant to the issue of legal 
critique. The school promotes itself as seeking to produce graduates who are 
 
 72 John Goldring, ‘Tradition or Progress in Legal Scholarship and Legal Education’ in John 
Goldring, Charles Sampford and Ralph Simmonds (eds), New Foundations in Legal Education 
(1998) 27, 28. 
 73 Charles Sampford and David Wood, ‘Theoretical Dimensions of Legal Education’ in John 
Goldring, Charles Sampford and Ralph Simmonds (eds), New Foundations in Legal Education 
(1998) 100, 115. 
 74 Andrew Stewart, ‘Educating Australian Lawyers’ in Charles Sampford, Sophie Blencowe and 
Suzanne Condlln (eds), Educating Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (1999) 132, 148–9 
(emphasis in original). 
 75 Griffith University, Law School Homepage (1999) <http://www.gu.edu.au/school/law/home 
.html> at 29 November 1999 (copy on file with author). 
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‘aware of gender and cross-cultural issues in law’ and who are ‘able to examine 
legal and non-legal issues critically’.76 
Some law schools have adopted teaching and learning policies that expressly 
include objectives relating to the teaching of legal critique. The University of 
Tasmania Law School’s ‘Strategic Plan’ sets out nine attributes with which the 
school hopes to imbue its students. The first four refer to some aspect of legal 
critique: 
• a critical knowledge of the institutions and operation of the Australian legal 
system and related legal systems, of the central concepts, principles and rules 
of those systems and of the values to which they give expression;  
• a critical knowledge and understanding of the nature and function of law 
and the roles it performs in the ordering and functioning of the wider social 
system;  
• a critical understanding of, and experience in, thinking about those influ-
ences and aspirations which have shaped the development of law; [and] 
• a critical appreciation of the moral, ethical and normative problems associ-
ated with the law …77 
At Flinders University the document ‘About the Law School’, under the head-
ing ‘Philosophy of Legal Education at Flinders’, states that the Bachelor of Laws 
at that university incorporates three key elements, the first of which is ‘the 
knowledge and critical evaluation of the Australian law with reference to its 
historical development and comparative place’.78 The policy lists as an essential 
ability, after legal research and reasoning skills, ‘critical evaluation of legal rules 
and policy issues’.79 
Some law schools now offer a substantial number of subjects that either ad-
dress critical perspectives on the law or teach students to think critically about it. 
At the University of Sydney, for example, two of the 12 compulsory law subjects 
in the undergraduate program are described as teaching critical cognitive skills. 
The subject ‘Law, Lawyers and Justice in Australian Society’ is described as 
approaching the law from ‘a range of perspectives’,80 and appears to be con-
cerned with teaching students to think critically about the law. ‘Criminal Law’ is 
described as having been designed to assist students to develop a critical under-
standing of certain key concepts, and as having a critical focus.81 Eleven of the 
52 elective subjects primarily approach the law from international, theoretical or 
critical perspectives. One of these elective subjects, ‘Critical Legal Studies’, 
specifically focuses on the critical movement of the same name.82 Another, ‘Law 
 
 76 Southern Cross University, School of Law and Justice Homepage (1999) <http://www.scu. 
edu.au/schools/lawj/> at 7 December 1999 (copy on file with author). 
 77 University of Tasmania Law School, Strategic Plan 1998–2000 (2000) 2–3 (emphasis added). 
 78 Flinders University of South Australia, About the Law School (2000) <http://wwwehlt.flinders. 
edu.au/law/about/> at 31 December 2000 (copy on file with author) (emphasis in original). 
 79 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
 80 The University of Sydney, Faculty of Law Handbook 2000 (1999) 8. 
 81 Ibid 7. 
 82 Ibid 13. 
   
M.U.L.R. — James — printed 13/12/2016 at 3:53 PM — page 980 of 17
  
980 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 24 
     
and Gender’, is described as critically examining feminist legal theories.83 The 
subject ‘Law, Communications, Culture and Global Economies’ critically 
examines the law in terms of its ability to keep up with new technologies.84 
There are a number of jurisprudence subjects that are expressly described as 
approaching the law from critical perspectives: ‘Sociological Jurisprudence’, 
‘Philosophy of Human Rights’, and ‘International/Comparative Jurisprudence’.85 
However, such policies and programs are in the minority. It would appear that, 
generally speaking, Australian law schools still give a relatively low priority to 
teaching legal critique. Only five of the 27 law schools expressly promote 
themselves as concerned with legal critique.86 Most law schools appear to be 
primarily concerned with advertising their close links with the profession and 
emphasising the satisfaction of local admission requirements: law schools would 
prefer to be perceived as ‘clinical’ rather than ‘critical’. Only 17 law schools are 
guided by teaching and learning policies that encourage legal critique, and of 
those 17 policies, only four contain more than a couple of token references to 
legal critique. None of the teaching and learning policies addresses legal critique 
in any depth. Many of the policies contain little or no reference at all to legal 
critique; those that do contain such references fail to clearly define their termi-
nology or to expand upon their conceptions of legal critique. None of the law 
schools has adopted a clear definition of what it means to teach law critically. It 
almost appears as though law schools and universities assume that the meaning of 
the words ‘critical’ and ‘critique’ is self evident. 
The proportion of subjects described as teaching some form of legal critique 
ranges across schools, from one percent to only 15 percent, with most schools 
falling below the 10 percent mark. None of the law schools appears to have 
adopted an approach to legal critique that pervades the whole law program. By 
far the majority of subjects taught by the law schools are still doctrinal or clinical. 
What few critical subjects do exist are in the minority and are generally isolated 
from the rest of the curriculum. 
Recent graduate destination surveys have shown that more and more law stu-
dents are electing not to practise law. Nevertheless, it seems that the present trend 
in Australian legal education is for the teaching of law to become, and to be seen 
to be becoming, more practice-oriented. Satisfaction of the perceived require-
ments of the profession is still one of the highest priorities. The tendency today 
for many law schools to promote themselves as taking a more practical or 
‘real-world’ approach has coincided with an improvement in relations between 
academics and practitioners. 87 This trend has important consequences for the 
 
 83 Ibid 16. 
 84 Ibid. 
 85 Ibid 15–19. 
 86 Griffith University Law School, Macquarie University Law School, Southern Cross University 
School of Law and Justice, University of New South Wales Law School, and the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Western Sydney (Macarthur). 
 87 Charles Sampford and Suzanne Condlln, ‘Educating Lawyers for Changing Process’ in Charles 
Sampford, Sophie Blencowe and Suzanne Condlln (eds), Educating Lawyers for a Less Adver-
sarial System (1999) 173, 195–6; Stewart, above n 74, 146. 
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role of critique in legal education. A law school’s proclaiming its intention to 
place a greater emphasis on legal critique may be perceived by the profession, 
rightly or wrongly, as a step towards making its courses more ‘theoretical’ and 
less ‘practical’. There is a fear that taking such a step may break the connections 
with the profession that law schools have in recent years worked so hard to 
reforge. Most law schools, thus, persist in their attempts to cater to the needs of 
the legal profession, and to teach law from a more practical perspective, focus-
sing on technical excellence, advocacy, drafting, court procedures and negotia-
tion, and placing little emphasis upon legal critique.88 
It cannot be denied that the emphasis by Australian law schools on legal cri-
tique has increased since the beginning of the century, when law was taught 
solely by legal practitioners on a part-time basis. It has even increased since I 
completed my own undergraduate degree a decade ago. This notwithstanding, it 
appears that Australian legal education is, in many ways, returning to its colonial 
origins: the focus is becoming less ‘theoretical’ and more practical. Professional 
bodies are exerting an increasing influence over the curriculum, and more law 
courses are being taught by practitioners. Legal critique is strong in Australian 
scholarship, and many individual law teachers choose to incorporate critique in 
their teaching, but Australian law schools still place an unduly low emphasis on 
legal critique. Ultimately, it remains a marginalised approach to the teaching 
of law. 
 
 88 Stewart, above n 74, 145–6. 
